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Abstract
Assuming that cards are dealt with replacement from a single deck and
that each of Player and Banker sees the total of his own two-card hand but
not its composition, baccara is a 2 × 288 matrix game, which was solved
by Kemeny and Snell in 1957. Assuming that cards are dealt without
replacement from a d-deck shoe and that Banker sees the composition of
his own two-card hand while Player sees only his own total, baccara is a 2×
2484 matrix game, which was solved by Downton and Lockwood in 1975 for
d = 1, 2, . . . , 8. Assuming that cards are dealt without replacement from
a d-deck shoe and that each of Player and Banker sees the composition
of his own two-card hand, baccara is a 25 × 2484 matrix game, which is
solved herein for every positive integer d.
AMS 2010 subject classification: Primary 91A05; secondary 91A60.
Key words and phrases: baccara chemin de fer, sampling without replace-
ment, matrix game, strict dominance, kernel, solution, infinite precision.
1 Introduction
The game of baccara chemin de fer (briefly, baccara) played a key role in the
development of game theory. Bertrand’s (1889, pp. 38–42) analysis of whether
Player should draw or stand on a two-card total of 5 was the starting point
of Borel’s investigation of strategic games (Dimand and Dimand 1996, p. 132).
Borel (1924) described Bertrand’s study as “extremely incomplete” but did
not himself contribute to baccara. It is unfortunate that Borel was unaware
of Dormoy’s (1873) work, which was less incomplete. Von Neumann (1928),
after proving the minimax theorem, remarked that he would analyze baccara
in a subsequent paper. But a solution of the game would have to wait until
the dawn of the computer age. Kemeny and Snell (1957), assuming that cards
are dealt with replacement from a single deck and that each of Player and
Banker sees the total of his own two-card hand but not its composition, found
the unique solution of the resulting 2 × 288 matrix game. In practice, cards
∗Partially supported by a grant from the Simons Foundation (209632).
1
are dealt without replacement from a sabot, or shoe, containing six 52-card
decks. Downton and Lockwood (1975), allowing a d-deck shoe dealt without
replacement and assuming that Banker sees the composition of his own two-
card hand while Player sees only his own total, found the unique solution of the
resulting 2 × 2484 matrix game for d = 1, 2, . . . , 8. They used an algorithm of
Foster (1964).
Our aim in this paper is to solve the game without simplifying assumptions.
We allow a d-deck shoe dealt without replacement and allow each of Player
and Banker to see the composition of his own two-card hand, making baccara
a 25 × 2484 matrix game. We derive optimal Player and Banker strategies and
determine the value of the game, doing so for every positive integer d. We too
make use of Foster’s (1964) algorithm. We suspect that these optimal strategies
are uniquely optimal, but we do not have a proof of uniqueness.
It will be convenient for what follows to classify the game-theoretic models
of baccara in two ways. First, we classify them according to how the cards are
dealt.
• Model A. Cards are dealt with replacement from a single deck.
• Model B. Cards are dealt without replacement from a d-deck shoe.
Second, we classify them according to the information available to Player and
Banker about their own two-card hands.
• Model 1. Each of Player and Banker sees the total of his own two-card
hand but not its composition.
• Model 2. Banker sees the composition of his own two-card hand while
Player sees only his own total.
• Model 3. Each of Player and Banker sees the composition of his own
two-card hand.
(We do not consider the fourth possibility.) Thus, Model A1 is the model of
Kemeny and Snell (1957), Model B2 is the model of Downton and Lockwood
(1975), and Model B3 is our primary focus here. Model A2 was discussed
by Downton and Holder (1972), but Models A3, B1, and B3 have not been
considered before, as far as we know.
Like others before us, we restrict our attention to the classical parlor game
of baccara chemin de fer, in contrast to the modern casino game. (Following
Deloche and Oguer 2007, we use the authentic French spelling “baccara” rather
than the more conventional “baccarat” to emphasize this.) The rules are as
follows. Denominations A, 2–9, 10, J, Q, K have values 1, 2–9, 0, 0, 0, 0,
respectively. The total of a hand, consisting of two or three cards, is the sum
of the values of the cards, modulo 10. In other words, only the final digit of
the sum is used to evaluate a hand. Two cards are dealt face down to Player
and two face down to Banker, and each looks only at his own hand. The object
of the game is to have the higher total (closer to 9) at the end of play. A
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two-card total of 8 or 9 is a natural. If either hand is a natural, the game
is over and the higher total wins. Hands of equal total result in a push (no
money is exchanged). If neither hand is a natural, Player then has the option of
drawing a third card. If he exercises this option, his third card is dealt face up.
Next, Banker, observing Player’s third card, if any, has the option of drawing
a third card. This completes the game, and the higher total wins. Winning
bets on Player’s hand are paid even money, with Banker, as the name suggests,
playing the role of the bank. Again, hands of equal total result in a push. Since
bystanders can bet on Player’s hand, Player’s strategy is restricted. He must
draw on a two-card total of 4 or less and stand on a two-card total of 6 or 7.
When his two-card total is 5, he is free to draw or stand as he chooses. Banker,
on whose hand no one can bet, has no restrictions on his strategy.
In the modern casino game, not only is Banker’s strategy highly constrained
but the casino collects a five percent commission on Banker wins.
In Section 3, we show how to evaluate the payoff matrix. We emphasize
Model B3 but treat the other models as well. In Section 4, we use strict domi-
nance to reduce the payoff matrix under Model B3 to 25×2nd , where nd depends
on the number of decks d and satisfies 18 ≤ nd ≤ 23. We get similar reductions
of the other models. To proceed further, in Section 5 we re-examine the unique
solution of Kemeny and Snell (1957) under Model A1 and notice that there are
multiple solutions under Models A2 and A3. In Section 6 we derive the unique
solution under Model B1 for every positive integer d. Model B1 is of interest
because it shows the price of the “with replacement” assumption more clearly
than do Models B2 and B3. In Section 7 we re-derive the unique solution of
Downton and Lockwood (1975) under Model B2, extending it to every positive
integer d. These results lead us in Section 8 to a solution under Model B3 for
every positive integer d. The feature of the game that allows this is that, under
Model B3, the kernel is 2× 2. The two Banker pure strategies specified by the
kernel are dependent on d, while the two Player pure strategies specified by the
kernel are independent of d. Optimality proofs are computer-assisted, with all
computations carried out in infinite precision using Mathematica.
2 Preliminaries
The following lemma was used implicitly by Kemeny and Snell (1957), Foster
(1964), and Downton and Lockwood (1975), and explicitly by Ethier (2010,
p. 166). The latter reference has a proof.
Lemma 1. Let m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1 and consider an m × 2n matrix game of the
following form. Player I has m pure strategies, labeled 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1. Player
II has 2n pure strategies, labeled by the subsets T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}. For i =
0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, there exist probabilities pi(0) ≥ 0, pi(1) > 0, . . . , pi(n) > 0
with pi(0) + pi(1) + · · · + pi(n) = 1 together with a real number ai(0), and for
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l = 1, 2, . . . , n, there exists a real m× 2 matrix

a0,0(l) a0,1(l)
a1,0(l) a1,1(l)
...
...
am−1,0(l) am−1,1(l)

 .
The m× 2n matrix game has payoff matrix with (i, T ) entry given by
ai,T := pi(0)ai(0) +
∑
l∈T
pi(l)ai,1(l) +
∑
l∈T c
pi(l)ai,0(l) (1)
for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} and T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Here T c := {1, 2, . . . , n} − T .
We define
T0 := {1 ≤ l ≤ n : ai,0(l) < ai,1(l) for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1},
T1 := {1 ≤ l ≤ n : ai,0(l) > ai,1(l) for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1},
T∗ := {1, 2, . . . , n} − T0 − T1,
and put n∗ := |T∗|. Then, given T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, player II’s pure strategy T is
strictly dominated unless T1 ⊂ T ⊂ T1∪T∗. Therefore, the m× 2
n matrix game
can be reduced to an m× 2n∗ matrix game.
Remark. The game can be thought of as follows. Player I chooses a pure strategy
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. Let Zi be a random variable with distribution P(Zi =
l) = pi(l) for l = 0, 1, . . . , n. Given that Zi = 0, the game is over and player I’s
conditional expected gain is ai(0). If Zi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then player II observes
Zi (but not i) and based on this information chooses a “move” j ∈ {0, 1}. Given
that Zi = l and player II chooses move 1 (resp., move 0), player I’s conditional
expected gain is ai,1(l) (resp., ai,0(l)). Thus, player II’s pure strategies can
be identified with subsets T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, with player II choosing move 1 if
Zi ∈ T and move 0 if Zi ∈ T
c. The lemma implies that, regardless of player I’s
strategy choice, it is optimal for player II to choose move 1 if Zi ∈ T1 and move
0 if Zi ∈ T0.
We now formalize Foster’s (1964) algorithm for solving 2× 2n matrix games
as described in the special case of Lemma 1 in which m = 2. (See also Foster’s
discussion of Kendall and Murchland 1964.) The method is purely algebraic, so
we simplify the notation slightly by defining
ei(0) := pi(0)ai(0), ei,j(l) := pi(l)ai,j(l)
for i, j = 0, 1 and l = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Lemma 2. Let n ≥ 1 and consider a 2 × 2n matrix game of the following
form. Player I has two pure strategies, labeled 0 and 1. Player II has 2n pure
strategies, labeled by the subsets T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}. There exist real numbers
e0(0) and e1(0) and, for l = 1, 2, . . . , n, a real 2× 2 matrix(
e0,0(l) e0,1(l)
e1,0(l) e1,1(l)
)
.
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The 2× 2n matrix game has payoff matrix with (i, T ) entry given by
ai,T := ei(0) +
∑
l∈T
ei,1(l) +
∑
l∈T c
ei,0(l)
for i ∈ {0, 1} and T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We define
T00 := {1 ≤ l ≤ n : e0,0(l) < e0,1(l) and e1,0(l) < e1,1(l)},
T01 := {1 ≤ l ≤ n : e0,0(l) < e0,1(l) and e1,0(l) > e1,1(l)},
T10 := {1 ≤ l ≤ n : e0,0(l) > e0,1(l) and e1,0(l) < e1,1(l)},
T11 := {1 ≤ l ≤ n : e0,0(l) > e0,1(l) and e1,0(l) > e1,1(l)},
and assume that T00 ∪T01 ∪T10 ∪T11 = {1, 2, . . . , n}. If player I uses the mixed
strategy (1− p, p), then player II’s best response is
T (p) := T11 ∪ {l ∈ T01 : p(l) < p} ∪ {l ∈ T10 : p(l) > p}, (2)
where
p(l) :=
e0,0(l)− e0,1(l)
e0,0(l)− e0,1(l) + e1,1(l)− e1,0(l)
.
This player I mixed strategy and player II best response leads to a player I
expected gain of
V (p) := (1 − p)e0 + p e1 +
∑
{l∈T01:p(l)<p}∪{l∈T10:p(l)>p}
[(1 − p)e0,1(l) + p e1,1(l)]
+
∑
{l∈T01:p(l)≥p}∪{l∈T10:p(l)≤p}
[(1− p)e0,0(l) + p e1,0(l)], (3)
where
ei := ei(0) +
∑
l∈T11
ei,1(l) +
∑
l∈T00
ei,0(l).
The function p 7→ V (p) is the lower envelope of the family of linear functions
p 7→ (1 − p)a0,T + p a1,T , where T ranges over T11 ⊂ T ⊂ T11 ∪ T01 ∪ T10.
Therefore, the value of the game is
V := max
0≤p≤1
V (p) = max
(
V (0), V (1), max
l∈T01∪T10
V (p(l))
)
= V (p∗),
If the last equality uniquely determines p∗ and if p∗ = p(l∗) for a unique l∗ ∈
T01 ∪ T10, then player I’s unique optimal strategy is (1 − p
∗, p∗) and the two
columns of the kernel are uniquely specified as T (p∗) and T (p∗) ∪ {l∗}. Their
unique optimal mixture (1− q∗, q∗) is obtained by solving the 2× 2 kernel.
Proof. Notice that l belongs to T (p) if l ∈ T11 or if both l ∈ T01 ∪ T10 and
(1− p)e0,1(l) + p e1,1(l) < (1− p)e0,0(l) + p e1,0(l),
implying (2). The function (3) is continuous and piecewise linear, hence is
maximized at 0, 1, or one of the points p(l) at which its slope changes. The
remaining conclusions of the lemma follow easily.
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3 Evaluation of the payoff matrix
We begin by considering the game under Model B3. Let X1 ≤ X2 be the
values of the two cards dealt to Player and Y1 ≤ Y2 the values of the two
cards dealt to Banker. Define the function M : {0, 1, . . .} 7→ {0, 1, . . . , 9} by
M(i) := Mod(i, 10). Then X := M(X1 + X2) is Player’s two-card total and
Y := M(Y1 + Y2) is Banker’s two-card total. On the event {X ≤ 7, Y ≤ 7},
let X3 denote the value of Player’s third card if he draws, and let X3 := ∅ if
he stands. Similarly, let Y3 denote the value of Banker’s third card if he draws,
and let Y3 := ∅ if he stands.
As the rules specify, Player’s pure strategies can be indexed by the sets S
satisfying
{(i1, i2) : 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ 9 :M(i1 + i2) ≤ 4}
⊂ S ⊂ {(i1, i2) : 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ 9 :M(i1 + i2) ≤ 5}. (4)
Assuming X ≤ 7 and Y ≤ 7, Player draws if (X1, X2) ∈ S and stands otherwise.
Since the set of pairs (i1, i2) satisfying 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ 9 and M(i1 + i2) = 5
contains (0, 5), (1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), and (7, 8), it follows that Player has 25 pure
strategies.
On the other hand, Banker’s pure strategies can be indexed by the sets T
satisfying
T ⊂ {(j1, j2) : 0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ 9, M(j1 + j2) ≤ 7} × {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9,∅}. (5)
Assuming X ≤ 7 and Y ≤ 7, Banker draws if (Y1, Y2, X3) ∈ T and stands
otherwise. Since there are 44 pairs (j1, j2) satisfying 0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ 9 and
M(j1 + j2) ≤ 7, and since 44 × 11 = 484, it follows that Banker has 2
484 pure
strategies.
Thus, baccara is a 25 × 2484 matrix game. Let us denote by GS,T Player’s
profit from a one-unit bet when he adopts pure strategy S and Banker adopts
pure strategy T , so that aS,T := E[GS,T ] is the (S, T ) entry in the payoff matrix.
Then
aS,T = E[GS,T ]
= P(X ∈ {8, 9}, X > Y )− P(Y ∈ {8, 9}, Y > X)
+ E[GS,T 1{X≤7, Y≤7}]
= E[GS,T 1{X≤7, Y≤7}]
=
∑
M(j1+j2)≤7
9∑
k=0
P((X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k)
· E[GS,T | (X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k]
+
∑
M(j1+j2)≤7
P((X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅)
· E[GS,T | (X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅], (6)
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where Sc := {(i1, i2) : 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ 9, M(i1 + i2) ≤ 7} − S.
Let us now define, for S and T , for (j1, j2) satisfying 0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ 9 and
M(j1 + j2) ≤ 7, and for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9},
aS,l(j1, j2, k) := E[GS,T | (X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k],
aS,l(j1, j2,∅) := E[GS,T | (X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅],
(7)
where l = 1 if (j1, j2, k) (resp., (j1, j2,∅)) belongs to T ; and l = 0 if (j1, j2, k)
(resp., (j1, j2,∅)) belongs to T
c (the complement of T relative to (5)). Defining
also
pS(j1, j2, k) := P((X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k),
pS(j1, j2,∅) := P((X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅),
we have, from (6),
aS,T =
∑
(j1,j2,k)∈T with k 6=∅
pS(j1, j2, k)aS,1(j1, j2, k)
+
∑
(j1,j2,k)∈T c with k 6=∅
pS(j1, j2, k)aS,0(j1, j2, k)
+
∑
(j1,j2,∅)∈T
pS(j1, j2,∅)aS,1(j1, j2,∅)
+
∑
(j1,j2,∅)∈T c
pS(j1, j2,∅)aS,0(j1, j2,∅). (8)
To evaluate the conditional expectations in (7), we condition on (X1, X2):
aS,l(j1, j2, k)
=
∑
(i1,i2)∈S
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k)
· E[GS,T | (X1, X2) = (i1, i2), (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k] (9)
if k 6= ∅ and
aS,l(j1, j2,∅)
=
∑
(i1,i2)∈Sc
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅)
· E[GS,T | (X1, X2) = (i1, i2), (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅]. (10)
To evaluate the conditional expectations in (9) and (10), there are four cases to
consider:
Case 1. (i1, i2) ∈ S, (j1, j2, k) ∈ T with k 6= ∅ (both Player and Banker
draw). Here, for d decks,
E[GS,T | (X1, X2) = (i1, i2), (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k]
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=9∑
l=0
4d(1 + 3δl,0)− δl,i1 − δl,i2 − δl,j1 − δl,j2 − δl,k
52d− 5
· sgn(M(i1 + i2 + k)−M(j1 + j2 + l)), (11)
which becomes, as d→∞,
=
9∑
l=0
1 + 3δl,0
13
sgn(M(i1 + i2 + k)−M(j1 + j2 + l)). (12)
Case 2. (i1, i2) ∈ S, (j1, j2, k) ∈ T
c with k 6= ∅ (Player draws, Banker
stands). Regardless of the number of decks,
E[GS,T | (X1, X2) = (i1, i2), (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k]
= sgn(M(i1 + i2 + k)−M(j1 + j2)).
Case 3. (i1, i2) ∈ S
c, (j1, j2,∅) ∈ T (Player stands, Banker draws). For d
decks,
E[GS,T | (X1, X2) = (i1, i2), (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅]
=
9∑
l=0
4d(1 + 3δl,0)− δl,i1 − δl,i2 − δl,j1 − δl,j2
52d− 4
· sgn(M(i1 + i2)−M(j1 + j2 + l)), (13)
which becomes, as d→∞,
=
9∑
l=0
1 + 3δl,0
13
sgn(M(i1 + i2)−M(j1 + j2 + l)). (14)
Case 4. (i1, i2) ∈ S
c, (j1, j2,∅) ∈ T
c (both Player and Banker stand).
Regardless of the number of decks,
E[GS,T | (X1, X2) = (i1, i2), (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅]
= sgn(M(i1 + i2)−M(j1 + j2)).
Finally, to evaluate
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k),
we begin with a full d-deck shoe except for three cards, one j1, one j2, and one
k, removed. It will comprise m0 0s, m1 1s, . . . , and m9 9s, where
mr := 4d(1 + 3δr,0)− δr,j1 − δr,j2 − δr,k, r = 0, 1, . . . , 9.
The number of equally likely two-card hands is
(
52d−3
2
)
, and the number of those
that belong to S is
m :=
∑
(u1,u2)∈S
mu1(mu2 − δu2,u1)
1 + δu1,u2
.
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Then
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k)
=
mi1(mi2 − δi2,i1)
1 + δi1,i2
1S((i1, i2))
m
(15)
and
pS(j1, j2, k) = P((Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k)
· P((X1, X2) ∈ S | (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k)
=
(2 − δj1,j2)4d(1 + 3δj1,0)[4d(1 + 3δj2,0)− δj2,j1 ]
(52d)2
·
4d(1 + 3δk,0)− δk,j1 − δk,j2
52d− 2
m(
52d−3
2
) . (16)
Also, to evaluate
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅),
we begin with a full d-deck shoe except for two cards, one j1 and one j2, removed.
It will comprise m′0 0s, m
′
1 1s, . . . , and m
′
9 9s, where
m′r := 4d(1 + 3δr,0)− δr,j1 − δr,j2 , r = 0, 1, . . . , 9.
The number of equally likely two-card hands is
(
52d−2
2
)
, and the number of those
that belong to Sc is
m′ :=
∑
(u1,u2)∈Sc
m′u1(m
′
u2
− δu2,u1)
1 + δu1,u2
.
Then
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅)
=
m′i1(m
′
i2
− δi2,i1)
1 + δi1,i2
1Sc((i1, i2))
m′
(17)
and
pS(j1, j2,∅) = P((Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅)
· P((X1, X2) ∈ S
c | (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅) (18)
=
(2− δj1,j2)4d(1 + 3δj1,0)[4d(1 + 3δj2,0)− δj2,j1 ]
(52d)2
m′(
52d−2
2
) .
This suffices to complete the evaluation of (9) and (10) when cards are dealt
without replacement from a d-deck shoe.
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The assumption that cards are dealt with replacement from a single deck can
be modeled by letting d → ∞ in the assumption that cards are dealt without
replacement from a d-deck shoe. The formulas are simpler in this case:
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = k)
=
(2− δi1,i2)(1 + 3δi1,0)(1 + 3δi2,0)1S((i1, i2))
89 + 8 |S ∩ {(0, 5)}|+ 2 |S ∩ {(1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), (7, 8)}|
, (19)
pS(j1, j2, k)
=
(2− δj1,j2)(1 + 3δj1,0)(1 + 3δj2,0)
(13)2
1 + 3δk,0
13
·
89 + 8 |S ∩ {(0, 5)}|+ 2 |S ∩ {(1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), (7, 8)}|
(13)2
, (20)
P((X1, X2) = (i1, i2) | (X1, X2) ∈ S
c, (Y1, Y2) = (j1, j2), X3 = ∅)
=
(2− δi1,i2)(1 + 3δi1,0)(1 + 3δi2,0)1Sc((i1, i2))
32 + 8 |Sc ∩ {(0, 5)}|+ 2 |Sc ∩ {(1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), (7, 8)}|
, (21)
pS(j1, j2,∅)
=
(2− δj1,j2)(1 + 3δj1,0)(1 + 3δj2,0)
(13)2
·
32 + 8 |Sc ∩ {(0, 5)}|+ 2 |Sc ∩ {(1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), (7, 8)}|
(13)2
. (22)
Here 89 comes from 25+ 16+ 16+ 16+ 16, where the summands correspond to
totals 0, 1, 2, 3, 4; 32 is 16 + 16, corresponding to totals 6 and 7.
In summary, we can evaluate (8) under Model B3 or A3. Restricting S to
the two extremes in (4), we obtain (8) under Model B2 or A2 as a special case.
Finally, as for Models B1 and A1, we can derive the analogue of (8) from results
already obtained. Specifically,
aS◦,T◦ =
∑
(j,k)∈T◦ with k 6=∅
pS◦(j, k)aS◦,1(j, k)
+
∑
(j,k)∈(T◦)c with k 6=∅
pS◦(j, k)aS◦,0(j, k)
+
∑
(j,∅)∈T◦
pS◦(j,∅)aS◦,1(j,∅)
+
∑
(j,∅)∈(T◦)c
pS◦(j,∅)aS◦,0(j,∅),
where
aS◦,l(j, k) := P (GS◦,T◦ | X ∈ S
◦, Y = j, X3 = k)
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=
∑
M(j1+j2)=j
pS(j1, j2, k)aS,l(j1, j2, k)/pS◦(j, k),
aS◦,l(j,∅) := P (GS◦,T◦ | X ∈ (S
◦)c, Y = j, X3 = ∅)
=
∑
M(j1+j2)=j
pS(j1, j2,∅)aS,l(j1, j2,∅)/pS◦(j,∅),
pS◦(j, k) = P (X ∈ S
◦, Y = j, X3 = k) =
∑
M(j1+j2)=j
pS(j1, j2, k),
and
pS◦(j,∅) = P (X ∈ (S
◦)c, Y = j, X3 = ∅) =
∑
M(j1+j2)=j
pS(j1, j2,∅);
here S◦ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} or {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, (S◦)c = {0, 1, . . . , 7} − S◦, and T ◦ ⊂
{0, 1, . . . , 7} × {0, 1, . . . , 9,∅}, while S and T are the corresponding subsets of
{(i1, i2) : 0 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ 9, M(i1 + i2) ≤ 7} and {(j1, j2) : 0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤
9, M(j1 + j2) ≤ 7} × {0, 1, . . . , 9,∅}, respectively.
4 Banker’s strictly dominated pure strategies
Our next step is to show that Lemma 1 applies (with Player and Banker playing
the roles of player I and player II, respectively), allowing us to reduce the game
to a more manageable size. The payoff matrix (8) has the form (1) with m = 32,
n = 484, pi(0) = P(X ∈ {8, 9} or Y ∈ {8, 9}), and ai(0) = 0. It remains to
evaluate T0, T1, and T∗ of the lemma.
Results are summarized in Table 1. T1 (resp., T0) is the set of triples
(j1, j2, k) for which aS,1(j1, j2, k) < aS,0(j1, j2, k) (resp., >) for each of Player’s
25 pure strategies S, indicated by a D (resp., S) in the corresponding entry of
the table. T∗ is the remaining set of triples (j1, j2, k), indicated by a ∗ in the
corresponding entry of the table. Of particular interest is nd := |T∗|.
Theorem 3. (a) Under Model B3 with the number of decks being a positive
integer d, Lemma 1 applies. The sets T0, T1, and T∗ of the lemma can be
inferred from Table 1, with entries S, D, and ∗ located at elements of T0, T1,
and T∗, respectively. In particular, for d = 1, 2, . . . , 10, nd = 23, 21, 20, 19, 19,
18, 21, 23, 23, 23, respectively, and, if d ≥ 11, nd = 22.
(b) Exactly the same conclusions hold under Model B2.
(c) Lemma 1 applies under Models A2 and A3, with the results those under
Models B2 and B3 with d ≥ 11.
Proof. It will occasionally be convenient to label the 25 choices of S by the in-
tegers 0 to 31. Strategy 0 (resp., strategy 31) denotes Player’s pure strategy of
standing (resp., drawing) on a two-card total of 5, regardless of its composition.
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Table 1: Banker’s optimal move (preliminary version) under Model B2 or B3
with d = 6, indicated by D (draw) or S (stand), except in the n6 = 18 cases
indicated by ∗ in which it depends on Player’s strategy. Adjustments to the
table for other positive integers d are specified by footnotes. Under Model A2
or A3, results are the same as those under Model B2 or B3 with d ≥ 11.
Banker’s Player’s third card (∅ if Player stands)
two-card
total hand 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅
0, 1, 2 D D D D D D D D D D D
3 (0, 3) D D D D D D D D S2 ∗ D
3 (1, 2) D D D D D D D D S1 ∗ D
3 (4, 9) D D D D D D D D S5 ∗ D
3 (5, 8) D D D D D D D D S3 ∗ D
3 (6, 7) D D D D D D D D S3 ∗ D
4 (0, 4) S S8 D1 D D D D D S S D
4 (1, 3) S S7 D1 D D D D D S S D
4 (2, 2) S ∗3 D1 D D D D D S S D
4 (5, 9) S S7 D1 D D D D D S S D
4 (6, 8) S ∗ D D D D D D S S D
4 (7, 7) S ∗ D D D D D D S S D
5 (0, 5) S S S S ∗1 D D D S S D
5 (1, 4) S S S S S7 D D D S S D
5 (2, 3) S S S S S8 D D D S S D
5 (6, 9) S S S S ∗1 D D D S S D
5 (7, 8) S S S S ∗1 D D D S S D
6 (0, 6) S S S S S S D D S S ∗
6 (1, 5) S S S S S S D D S S ∗
6 (2, 4) S S S S S S D D S S ∗
6 (3, 3) S S S S S S ∗11 D S S ∗
6 (7, 9) S S S S S S D D S S ∗
6 (8, 8) S S S S S S D D S S ∗
7 S S S S S S S S S S S
1Replace S by ∗ and D by ∗ and ∗ by S if d = 1.
2Replace S by ∗ if d ≤ 2. 7Replace S by ∗ if d ≥ 7.
3Replace S by ∗ and ∗ by S if d ≤ 3. 8Replace S by ∗ if d ≥ 8.
5Replace S by ∗ if d ≤ 5. 11Replace ∗ by D if d ≥ 11.
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More generally, strategy u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 31} is specified by the 5-bit binary repre-
sentation of u. For example, strategy 19 (binary 10011) corresponds to drawing
on (0, 5), standing on (1, 4) and (2, 3), and drawing on (6, 9) and (7, 8).
Table 1 is identical under Models B2 and B3 because, defining
bu(j1, j2, k) := au,1(j1, j2, k)− au,0(j1, j2, k)
for u = 0, 1, . . . , 31, 0 ≤ j1 ≤ j1 ≤ 9 with M(j1+ j2) ≤ 7, and k = 0, 1, . . . , 9,∅,
we have, with a few exceptions,
bu(j1, j2, k) ∈ [b0(j1, j2, k) ∧ b31(j1, j2, k), b0(j1, j2, k) ∨ b31(j1, j2, k)]
for u = 1, 2, . . . , 30. The exceptions occur only when d = 1 and only when
(j1, j2, k) = (0, 0, 9), (5, 5, 9), or (5, 6, 0). (See Section 7 for an explanation of
why this is to be expected.)
It follows that, if b0(j1, j2, k) < 0 and b31(j1, j2, k) < 0, then the (j1, j2, k)
entry in Table 1 is D (draw); in 301 of the 484 entries, this property holds for
every d ≥ 1. If b0(j1, j2, k) > 0 and b31(j1, j2, k) > 0, then the (j1, j2, k) entry
in Table 1 is S (stand); in 151 of the 484 entries, this property holds for every
d ≥ 1. If b0(j1, j2, k) > 0 > b31(j1, j2, k) or b0(j1, j2, k) < 0 < b31(j1, j2, k), then
the (j1, j2, k) entry in Table 1 is ∗; in 13 of the 484 entries, this property holds
for every d ≥ 1. This accounts for all but 19 entries in Table 1, those marked
with footnotes, in which the sign of b0(j1, j2, k) or b31(j1, j2, k) depends on d.
For example, one of the 19 is (3, 3, 6). Indeed,
b31(3, 3, 6) = −
2(80 d3 − 832 d2 + 135 d− 2)
(52 d− 5)(840 d2 − 114 d+ 1)
> 0 (resp., < 0)
for all d ≤ 10 (resp., d ≥ 11) and
b0(3, 3, 6) = −
2(848 d3 − 952 d2 + 135 d− 2)
(52 d− 5)(712 d2 − 102 d+ 1)
< 0
for all d ≥ 1. It follows that the (3, 3, 6) entry of Table 1 is ∗ if d ≤ 10 and D if
d ≥ 11. The other 483 cases are analyzed similarly.
Requiring that Banker make the optimal move in each of the cases that do
not depend on Player’s strategy, we have reduced the game, under Model B3
(resp., B2), to a 25 × 2nd (resp., 2× 2nd) matrix game, where 18 ≤ nd ≤ 23.
We have similar results for Model B1. Again, nd := |T∗|.
Theorem 4. (a) Under Model B1 with the number of decks being a positive
integer d, Lemma 1 applies. The sets T0, T1, and T∗ of the lemma can be
inferred from Table 2, with entries S, D, and ∗ located at elements of T0, T1,
and T∗, respectively. In particular, n1 = 4, n2 = 3, and, nd = 4 for all d ≥ 3.
(b) Lemma 1 applies under Model A1, with the results those under Model
B1 with d ≥ 4.
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Table 2: Banker’s optimal move (preliminary version) under Model B1 with
d = 6, indicated by D (draw) or S (stand), except in the n6 = 4 cases indicated
by ∗ in which it depends on Player’s strategy. Adjustments to the table for
other positive integers d are specified by footnotes. Under Model A1, results
are the same as those under Model B1 with d ≥ 4.
Banker’s Player’s third card (∅ if Player stands)
two-card
total 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅
0, 1, 2 D D D D D D D D D D D
3 D D D D D D D D S3 ∗ D
4 S ∗3 D1 D D D D D S S D
5 S S S S ∗2 D D D S S D
6 S S S S S S D D S S ∗
7 S S S S S S S S S S S
1Replace D by ∗ if d = 1.
2Replace ∗ by S if d ≤ 2.
3Replace S by ∗ and ∗ by S if d ≤ 3.
Proof. Let
bu(j, k) := au,1(j, k)− au,0(j, k),
where u = 0 corresponds to S◦ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and u = 1 corresponds to S◦ =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. If bu(j, k) < 0 for u = 0, 1, then the (j, k) entry in Table 2 is D;
in 54 of the 88 entries, this property holds for every d ≥ 1. If bu(j, k) > 0 for
u = 0, 1, then the (j, k) entry in Table 2 is S; in 28 of the 88 entries, this property
holds for every d ≥ 1. If b0(j, k) > 0 > b1(j, k) or b0(j, k) < 0 < b1(j, k), then
the (j, k) entry in Table 1 is ∗; in two of the 88 entries, namely (3, 9) and (6,∅),
this property holds for every d ≥ 1. This accounts for all but four entries in
Table 2, those marked with footnotes, in which the sign of bu(j, k) depends on
d for u = 0 or u = 1.
For example, one of the four is (5, 4). Indeed,
b1(5, 4) = −
15 360 d4 − 45 184 d3 + 9040 d2 − 588 d+ 13
(52 d− 5)(26 880 d3 − 4680 d2 + 242 d− 3)
< 0 (resp., > 0)
for d ≥ 3 (resp., d ≤ 2), and
b0(5, 4) =
1024 d4 + 37 248 d3 − 7792 d2 + 492 d− 7
(52 d− 5)(22 784 d3 − 3976 d2 + 194 d− 1)
> 0
for all d ≥ 1. Therefore, the entry in the (5, 4) position of Table 2 is ∗ if d ≥ 3
and S if d ≤ 2. The other 87 cases are analyzed similarly.
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5 Solutions under Models A1, A2, and A3
We recall Kemeny and Snell’s (1957) solution of the 2 × 288 matrix game that
assumes Model A1. (See Deloche and Oguer 2007 for an alternative approach
based on the extensive, rather than the strategic, form of the game.) Implicitly
using Lemma 1, they reduced the number of Banker pure strategies from 288 to
just 24 (see Theorem 4). The 2× 2 kernel of the game was determined to be
(B: S on 6,∅ B: D on 6,∅
P: S on 5 −4564 −2692
P: D on 5 −3705 −4121
)
24/(13)6, (23)
implying that the following Player and Banker strategies are uniquely optimal.
Player draws on a two-card total of 5 with probability
p =
9
11
≈ 0.818182, (24)
and Banker draws on a two-card total of 6, when Player stands, with probability
q =
859
2288
≈ 0.375437. (25)
The value of the game (to Player) is
v = −
679 568
53 094 899
≈ −0.0127991. (26)
The fully specified optimal strategy for Banker is given in Table 4 with d ≥ 4
and q as in (25).
Let us extend this analysis from Model A1 to Model A3. Again we have a
25 × 2484 matrix game, and the payoff matrix can be evaluated as in Section 4,
using (12), (14), and (19)–(22) in place of (11), (13), and (15)–(18). We can
apply Lemma 1 and reduce the game to a 25× 222 matrix game. We obtain the
special case of Table 1 in which d ≥ 11.
When we evaluate this 25×222 payoff matrix, we find that a number of rows
are identical. When several rows are identical, we eliminate duplicates. When
we make this reduction and rearrange the remaining rows in a more natural
order, we are left with 9 rows, labeled by 0–8, which have a special structure.
Specifically, row i corresponds to Player’s mixed strategy (under Model A1) of
drawing on a two-card total of 5 with probability i/8. The reason that multiples
of 1/8 appear is that, given that Player has a two-card total of 5, he has (0, 5),
(1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), or (7, 8) with probabilities 4/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, and 1/8,
respectively.
There are also a number of identical columns. When we apply a similar
reduction and rearrangement to the columns, we are left with 92(17)2 = 23 409
columns, labeled by
{0, 1, . . . , 8} × {0, 1, . . . , 16} × {0, 1, . . . , 8} × {0, 1, . . . , 16},
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which have a similar structure. Specifically, column (j1, j2, j3, j4) corresponds
to Banker’s mixed strategy (under Model A1) of drawing on a two-card total of
3, when Player’s third card is 9, with probability j1/8; of drawing on a two-card
total of 4, when Player’s third card is 1, with probability j2/16; of drawing on
a two-card total of 5, when Player’s third card is 4, with probability j3/8; and
of drawing on a two-card total of 6, when Player stands, with probability j4/16.
The reason that multiples of 1/8 or 1/16 appear is that, given that Banker has a
two-card total of 3, he has (0, 3), (1, 2), (4, 9), (5, 8), or (6, 7) with probabilities
4/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, and 1/8, respectively; given that Banker has a two-card total
of 4, he has (0, 4), (1, 3), (2, 2), (5, 9), (6, 8), or (7, 7) with probabilities 8/16,
2/16, 1/16, 2/16, 2/16, and 1/16, respectively; given that Banker has a two-card
total of 5, he has (0, 5), (1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), or (7, 8) with probabilities 4/8, 1/8,
1/8, 1/8, and 1/8, respectively; given that Banker has a two-card total of 6,
he has (0, 6), (1, 5), (2, 4), (3, 3), (7, 9), or (8, 8) with probabilities 8/16, 2/16,
2/16, 1/16, 2/16, and 1/16, respectively.
Next, we observe that column (j1, j2, j3, j4) is a mixture of the 2
4 (Model
A1) pure strategies of Banker that remain after application of Lemma 1. By the
results for Model A1, optimal strategies for Banker must satisfy j1 = 8, j2 = 0,
and j3 = 8. This reduces the game to a 9× 17 matrix game, whose columns we
relabel as 0–16. Specifically, column j corresponds to Banker’s mixed strategy
(under Model A1) of drawing on a two-card total of 6, when Player stands, with
probability j/16.
Finally, what is the solution of the 9 × 17 game? We have seen that rows
1–7 (resp., columns 1–15) are mixtures of rows 0 and 8 (resp., columns 0 and
16). In particular, rows 1–7 and columns 1–15 are dominated, but not strictly
dominated. Eliminating these rows and columns results in a 2× 2 matrix game,
namely the kernel (23). But eliminating dominated, but not strictly dominated,
rows and columns may result in a loss of solutions, and it does so in this case.
Indeed, there are many solutions. For Player, given two pure strategies i, i′ ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , 8} with
i
8
<
9
11
<
i′
8
, (27)
there is a unique p ∈ (0, 1) such that
(1 − p)
(
i
8
)
+ p
(
i′
8
)
=
9
11
,
and the (1−p, p)-mixture of pure strategies i and i′ is optimal for Player. There
are 7 choices of i and 2 choices of i′ that satisfy (27), hence 14 pairs (i, i′) that
meet this condition.
For Banker, given two pure strategies j, j′ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 16} with
j
16
<
859
2288
<
j′
16
, (28)
there is a unique q ∈ (0, 1) such that
(1 − q)
(
j
16
)
+ q
(
j′
16
)
=
859
2288
,
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and the (1 − q, q)-mixture of pure strategies j and j′ is optimal for Banker.
There are 7 choices of j and 10 choices of j′ that satisfy (28), hence 70 pairs
(j, j′) that meet this condition.
Each such pair (i, i′) can be combined with each such pair (j, j′), so there
are 14×70 = 980 pairs of optimal strategies of this form. These are the extreme
points of the convex set of equilibria. All 980 of them appear when the game
solver at http://banach.lse.ac.uk/ is applied.
Let us single out one of them. Take i = 6 and i′ = 7, getting p = 6/11, and
take j = 1 and j′ = 9, getting q = 179/286. This does not uniquely determine a
pair of optimal strategies because of the duplicate rows and columns that were
eliminated, but one pair of optimal mixed strategies to which this corresponds
is shown in Table 3. As we will see, this pair of optimal mixed strategies is the
Table 3: A pair of optimal mixed strategies in Model A3. For Banker’s fully
specified optimal strategy, see Table 5 with d ≥ 10.
Player’s two-card total is 5
(0, 5), (6, 9), (7, 8) D
(1, 4) (S,D) with (5/11, 6/11)
(2, 3) S
Banker’s two-card total is 6 and Player stands
(0, 6) (S,D) with (107/286, 179/286)
(1, 5), (2, 4), (3, 3), (7, 9) S
(8, 8) D
limiting pair of optimal mixed strategies under Model B3 as d→∞.
Foster (1964) remarked, “It is an interesting fact that this [optimal Player
mixed] strategy is often attained approximately in practice by standing on the
pair 2, 3 and calling [i.e., drawing] on any other combination adding to 5; this
gives approximately the right frequency of calling [i.e., drawing].” Actually,
it gives a drawing probability of 7/8, not the required 9/11. But, as Table 3
suggests, Player should stand also on (1, 4) with probability 5/11. Then the
probability of Player drawing on a two-card total of 5 is
3
4
+
1
8
6
11
=
9
11
.
A similar analysis applies under Model A2. Lemma 1 reduces the 2 × 2484
matrix game to 2 × 222. Eliminating duplicate columns reduces the game to
2× 92(17)2, and finally using the optimal solution under Model A1, we are left
with a 2× 17 matrix game. This is the game identified by Downton and Holder
(1972). As above, there are 70 extremal solutions, and they all appear when
the game solver at http://banach.lse.ac.uk/ is applied.
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Again, we single out one of them. Player draws on a two-card total of 5
with probability 9/11, and Banker follows Table 3. As we will see, this pair of
optimal mixed strategies is the limiting pair of optimal mixed strategies under
Model B2 as d→∞.
6 Solution under Model B1
Recall that Table 2 applies under Model B1. See Theorem 4.
In the case d = 6, the 2× 24 matrix game has kernel given by
( B: S on 6,∅ B: D on 6,∅
P: S on 5 −23 256 431 632 −13 884 629 124
P: D on 5 −18 880 657 128 −21 061 456 188
)
/1 525 814 595 305,
implying that the following Player and Banker strategies are uniquely optimal.
Player draws on a two-card total of 5 with probability
p6 =
7 631 761
9 407 656
≈ 0.811229, (29)
and Banker draws on a two-card total of 6, when Player stands, with probability
q6 =
546 971 813
1 444 075 196
≈ 0.378770. (30)
The value of the game (to Player) is
v6 = −
23 174 205 422 119 131
1 794 292 354 051 081 885
≈ −0.0129155. (31)
The fully specified optimal strategy for Banker is given in Table 4. Comparing
the solution under Model A1 with that under Model B1 reveals the effect of the
“with replacement” assumption. The solutions are identical except for the three
parameters [(24)–(26) vs. (29)–(31)]. For each parameter, the relative error is
less than one percent.
This analysis extends to every positive integer d.
Theorem 5. Under Model B1 with d being a positive integer, the following
Player and Banker strategies are uniquely optimal. Player draws on a two-card
total of 5 with probability
pd =
(36 864 d3 − 9312 d2 + 732 d− 23)
8(5632 d3 − 1138 d2 + 69 d− 1)
, d ≥ 1, (32)
and Banker draws on on a two-card total of 6, when Player stands, with proba-
bility
qd =
224 000 d4 − 55 712 d3 + 2936 d2 + 163 d− 14
2(52 d− 5)(5632 d3 − 1138 d2 + 69 d− 1)
, 1 ≤ d ≤ 3, (33)
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Table 4: Banker’s optimal move (final version) under Model B1 with d being
a positive integer, indicated by D (draw) or S (stand), or (S,D) (stand with
probability 1 − q, draw with probability q). Here q is as in (33)–(34). Under
Model A1, results are the same as those under Model B1 with d ≥ 4, except
that q is as in (25).
Banker’s Player’s third card (∅ if Player stands)
two-card
total 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅
0, 1, 2 D D D D D D D D D D D
3 D D D D D D D D S D D
4 S S D D D D D D S S D
5 S S S S ∗ D D D S S D
6 S S S S S S D D S S (S,D)
7 S S S S S S S S S S S
∗ D if d ≥ 4, S if d ≤ 3.
or
qd =
439 808 d4 − 107 456 d3 + 5248 d2 + 374 d− 31
4(52 d− 5)(5632 d3 − 1138 d2 + 69 d− 1)
, d ≥ 4. (34)
The value of the game (to Player) is
vd = −32 d
2(44 396 707 840 d7− 18 908 426 240 d6+ 3 279 293 696 d5
− 294 129 728 d4+ 14 418 160 d3− 407 352 d2 + 9543 d
− 220)/[(5632 d3 − 1138 d2 + 69 d− 1)(52 d)6], 1 ≤ d ≤ 3,
or
vd = −16 d
2(89 072 336 896 d7− 38 873 874 432 d6+ 6 969 345 536 d5
− 655 761 920 d4+ 34 638 784 d3− 1 090 952 d2 + 26 286 d
− 537)/[(5632 d3− 1138 d2 + 69 d− 1)(52 d)6], d ≥ 4. (35)
The fully specified optimal strategy for Banker is given in Table 4.
Proof. For d ≥ 4, the kernel of the 2× 24 payoff matrix is given by columns 10
and 11 (when columns are labeled from 0 to 15), namely


B: S on 6,∅ B: D on 6,∅
P: S on 5 4(1 168 384 d4− 284 720 d3 2 756 608 d4− 470 336 d3
+ 22 320 d2 − 446 d− 11) + 4656 d2 + 3072 d− 159
P: D on 5 2(1 896 960 d4− 461 984 d3 4 219 904 d4− 954 112 d3
+ 39 392 d2 − 1266 d+ 9) + 68 384 d2 − 852 d− 57

 (−64 d
2)
(52 d)6
.
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This implies (32) for d ≥ 4, (34), and (35).
To confirm this, we must show that, with A denoting the 2 × 24 payoff
matrix, we have
(1− pd, pd)A ≥ (vd, vd, . . . , vd).
This involves checking 16 inequalities (of which two are automatic). For exam-
ple, the eighth and ninth components of (1− pd, pd)A− (vd, vd, . . . , vd) equal
16 d2(278 921 216 d7− 1 057 021 952 d6+ 410 758 144 d5− 67 502 464 d4
+ 5 802 464 d3− 276 248 d2 + 7200 d− 97)
/[(5632 d3 − 1138 d2 + 69 d− 1)(52 d)6],
which is positive for d ≥ 4 and negative for 1 ≤ d ≤ 3. The 10th and 11th
components are 0, of course. The remaining components are positive for every
d ≥ 1.
A similar analysis can then be carried out for 1 ≤ d ≤ 3, in which case the
kernel is given by columns 8 and 9 (of 0–15).
We notice that the above kernel converges, as d→∞, to the kernel (23).
7 Solution under Model B2
The result that Table 1 is identical under Models B2 and B3 is less surprising
than it may first appear to be. In Section 5 we saw that, under Model A3 with
Player’s pure strategies labeled from 0 to 31, pure strategy u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 30} is
a (1− p, p) mixture of pure strategies 0 and 31, where
p =
4u1 + u2 + u3 + u4 + u5
8
∈
{1
8
,
2
8
, . . . ,
7
8
}
; (36)
here u1u2u3u4u5 is the binary form of u, that is, u1, u2, u3, u4, u5 ∈ {0, 1} and
u = 16u1 + 8u2 + 4u3 + 2u4 + u5. Consequently,
au,l(j1, j2, k) lies between a0,l(j1, j2, k) and a31,l(j1, j2, k) (37)
for all u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 30}, l = 0, 1, 0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ 9 with M(j1 + j2) ≤ 7,
and k = 0, 1, . . . , 9,∅. Under Model B3, the conditional expectations in (37)
should not differ much from their Model A3 counterparts, especially for large
d, hence we would expect that (37) holds with few exceptions. In fact, the only
exceptions occur when l = 1, M(j1 + j2) = 2, k = 8, and d ≤ 7 because in
these cases, a0,l(j1, j2, k) and a31,l(j1, j2, k) are very close. When we consider
the differences bu(j1, j2, k), there are even fewer exceptions, as noted previously.
One might ask why Model B2 was even considered by Downton and Lock-
wood (1975), inasmuch as its asymmetric assumption about the available infor-
mation (beyond the asymmetry inherent in the rules) may seem contrived. The
answer, we believe, is that there already existed an algorithm, due to Foster
(1964), for solving such games. That algorithm was formalized in Lemma 2 of
Section 2.
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Let us recall Downton and Lockwood’s (1975) solution of the 2×2484 matrix
game that assumes Model B2. In the case d = 6, the 2 × 2 kernel of the game
is found to be
(B: S on (0, 6),∅ B: D on (0, 6),∅
P: S on 5 −22 721 165 499 −18 033 241 115
P: D on 5 −19 018 265 931 −20 151 297 323
)
/1 525 814 595 305,
implying that the following Player and Banker strategies are uniquely optimal.
Player draws on a two-card total of 5 with probability
p6 =
477 191
592 524
≈ 0.805353,
and Banker draws on (0, 6), when Player stands, with probability
q6 =
77 143 741
121 269 912
≈ 0.636133.
The value of the game (to Player) is
v6 = −
974 653 793 197 999
75 340 147 272 374 985
≈ −0.0129367, (38)
which is less than (31) because Banker has additional options while Player’s
options are unchanged. The fully specified optimal strategy for Banker is given
in Table 5.
This analysis extends to every positive integer d. We do not display the
kernel, only the solution.
Theorem 6. Under Model B2 with d being a positive integer, the following
Player and Banker strategies are uniquely optimal. Player draws on a two-card
total of 5 with probability
pd =
(8 d− 1)(12 d− 1)(24 d− 1)
2 d(1408 d2 − 220 d+ 9)
, d ≥ 1,
and Banker draws on (0, 6), when Player stands, with probability
q1 =
290 383
450 072
, q2 =
2 591 845
4 119 192
, q3 =
9 294 089
14 521 368
, (39)
qd =
368 640 d4 − 68 624 d3 − 2168 d2 + 981 d− 48
8 d(52 d− 5)(1408 d2 − 220 d+ 9)
, 4 ≤ d ≤ 7, (40)
qd =
367 616 d4 − 67 728 d3 − 2416 d2 + 1015 d− 51
8 d(52 d− 5)(1408 d2 − 220 d+ 9)
, d = 8, 9, (41)
or
qd =
366 592 d4− 67 344 d3 − 2456 d2 + 1017 d− 51
8 d(52 d− 5)(1408 d2 − 220 d+ 9)
, d ≥ 10. (42)
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The value of the game (to Player) is
v1 = −
22 932 137
1 666 583 100
, v2 = −
8 220 886 553
620 866 384 425
, v3 = −
210 084 639 838
16 053 072 820 785
,
vd = −32 d(11 125 325 824 d
7− 4 182 669 312 d6+ 615 333 888 d5
− 43 467 904 d4 + 1 329 008 d3 + 5040 d2
− 1551 d+ 39)/[(1408 d2 − 220 d+ 9)(52 d)6], 4 ≤ d ≤ 7,
vd = −32 d(11 129 683 968 d
7− 4 218 739 712 d6+ 635 681 024 d5
− 47 725 760 d4 + 1 738 944 d3− 14 344 d2
− 1093 d+ 33)/[(1408 d2 − 220 d+ 9)(52 d)6], d = 8, 9,
or
vd = −32 d(11 134 042 112 d
7− 4 259 389 440 d6+ 648 152 320 d5
− 49 007 232 d4 + 1 788 256 d3− 14 816 d2
− 1089 d+ 33)/[(1408 d2 − 220 d+ 9)(52 d)6], d ≥ 10. (43)
The fully specified optimal strategy for Banker is given in Table 5.
Remark. This is a slightly stronger statement than that of Downton and Lock-
wood (1975).1 The reason for having different formulas for qd and vd in the six
cases d = 1, d = 2, d = 3, 4 ≤ d ≤ 7, d = 8, 9, and d ≥ 10 is that Banker’s two
pure strategies that determine the kernel do not vary if 4 ≤ d ≤ 7, if d = 8, 9, or
if d ≥ 10. This is a consequence of Table 5, which comes largely from Tables 2(a)
and 2(b) of Downton and Lockwood (1975).
Proof. We apply Lemma 2 for d = 1, 2, . . . , 19. Only (3, 3, 6) belongs to T10 (if
d ≤ 10). For each choice of d, the program runtime is about 15 seconds. For
d ≥ 20, the 22 points p(l) (l ∈ T01 ∪ T10), relabeled as p1, p2, . . . , p22, at which
Player’s expected payoff is evaluated satisfy p16 < p12 < p15 < p13 < p14 <
p5 < p4 < p1 < p3 < p2 < p22 < p17 < p21 < p18 < p19 < p20 < p11 < p10 <
p8 < p7 < p9 < p6, so the algorithm applies with a variable d. For d ≥ 20, V (p)
is maximized at p17 (or p(0, 6,∅)). At p22 (or p(8, 8,∅)), for example,
V (p22) = −32d(2 783 510 528 d
7− 1 188 571 136 d6+ 203 128 704 d5
− 16 568 896 d4 + 596 408 d3− 16 158 d2
+ 1855 d− 93)/[(352 d2 − 71 d+ 4)(52 d)6],
and this is less than V (p17) (see (43)) for all d ≥ 20, though the difference tends
to 0 as d→∞.
1They assumed d ≤ 8 and rounded results to four decimal places, but they also allowed
d = 1
2
, which we do not. Their Table 2(b), which graphically represents the dependence on d
in Banker’s optimal strategy, contains three ambiguities. Specifically, for (j1, j2, k) = (6, 8, 1)
and d = 2, for (j1, j2, k) = (2, 3, 4) and d = 8, and for (j1, j2, k) = (6, 9, 4) and d = 2, it is
uncertain whether D or S was intended. We have confirmed that D, S, and S, respectively,
were intended in these cases. Furthermore, their table seems to suggest that D applies when
(j1, j2, k) = (2, 3, 4) and d = 9, which is incorrect.
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Table 5: Banker’s optimal move (final version) under Model B2 or B3 with d
being a positive integer, indicated by D (draw), S (stand), or (S,D) (stand with
probability 1 − q, draw with probability q). In Model B2, q is as in (39)–(42),
and in Model B3, q is as in (49)–(52).
Banker’s Player’s third card (∅ if Player stands)
two-card
total 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ∅
0, 1, 2 D D D D D D D D D D D
3 D D D D D D D D S1 D D
4 S S2 D D D D D D S S D
5 S S S S ∗ D D D S S D
6 S S S S S S D3 D S S †
7 S S S S S S S S S S S
1Banker’s two-card total is 3 and Player’s third card is 8
(0, 3), (1, 2), (5, 8) S
(4, 9) S if d ≥ 2, D if d = 1
(6, 7) S if d ≥ 1 (Model B2)
S if d ≥ 2, D if d = 1 (Model B3)
2Banker’s two-card total is 4 and Player’s third card is 1
(0, 4), (1, 3), (2, 2), (5, 9) S
(6, 8), (7, 7) S if d ≥ 3, D if d ≤ 2
∗Banker’s two-card total is 5 and Player’s third card is 4
(0, 5), (7, 8) D if d ≥ 2, S if d = 1
(1, 4) S if d ≤ 7, D if d ≥ 8
(2, 3) S if d ≤ 9, D if d ≥ 10 (Model B2)
S if d ≤ 8, D if d ≥ 9 (Model B3)
(6, 9) D if d ≥ 3, S if d ≤ 2 (Model B2)
D if d ≥ 2, S if d = 1 (Model B3)
3Banker’s two-card total is 6 and Player’s third card is 6
(0, 6), (1, 5), (2, 4), (7, 9), (8, 8) D
(3, 3) D if d ≥ 4, S if d ≤ 3
†Banker’s two-card total is 6 and Player stands
(0, 6) (S,D) (Model B2)
(S,D) if d ≥ 2, S if d = 1 (Model B3)
(1, 5), (2, 4), (3, 3), (7, 9) S
(8, 8) D (Model B2)
D if d ≥ 2, (S,D) if d = 1 (Model B3)
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8 Solution under Model B3
We have reduced the game to a 25×2nd matrix game, where 18 ≤ nd ≤ 23. The
fact that Table 1 is identical under Models B2 and B3 suggests the existence
of a 2 × 2 kernel under Model B3 whose columns are the same as those of the
2×2 kernel under Model B2 as described in Section 7. Then the resulting 25×2
matrix game will of course have a 2×2 kernel, which is easy to find by graphical
or other methods, and it will remain to confirm that this kernel corresponds to
a solution of the 25 × 2nd matrix game.
As we will see, this approach works for all positive integers d except 1, 2,
and 9. These last three cases can be treated separately.
Let us begin with the case d = 6. Here the rows of the 32× 2 payoff matrix
are labeled from 0 to 31 as in Section 4, with the 5-bit binary form of the row
number specifying the strategy (1 indicates D and 0 indicates S, in the five
cases (0, 5), (1, 4), (2, 3), (6, 9), and (7, 8)). For example, row 19 (binary 10011)
corresponds to drawing on (0, 5), standing on (1, 4) and (2, 3), and drawing on
(6, 9) and (7, 8).
We could label the two columns in a similar way but with binary strings of
length 18 corresponding to the asterisks in Table 1, in the specific order (0, 3, 9),
(1, 2, 9), (4, 9, 9), (5, 8, 9), (6, 7, 9), (2, 2, 1), (6, 8, 1), (7, 7, 1), (0, 5, 4), (6, 9, 4),
(7, 8, 4), (3, 3, 6), (0, 6,∅), (1, 5,∅), (2, 4,∅), (3, 3,∅), (7, 9,∅), (8, 8,∅), reading
the string left to right. In that case, the two columns would be labeled
111 110 001 111 000 001 and 111 110 001 111 100 001. (44)
The kernel is easily found to be given by rows 19 and 27, so it is equal to
(B: S on (0, 6),∅ B: D on (0, 6),∅
P: S on (1, 4) −19 769 569 403 −19 425 699 931
P: D on (1, 4) −19 391 857 983 −19 783 609 631
)
/1 525 814 595 305,
implying that the following Player and Banker strategies are optimal. Player
draws on (1, 4) with probability
p6 =
35 003
74 880
≈ 0.467455, (45)
and Banker draws on (0, 6), when Player stands, with probability
q6 =
18 885 571
36 781 056
≈ 0.513459. (46)
The value of the game (to Player) is
v6 = −
73 356 216 203 119
5 712 649 844 821 920
≈ −0.0128410, (47)
which is greater than (38) because Player has additional options while Banker’s
options are unchanged. The fully specified optimal strategies for Player and
Banker are given in Tables 6 and 5.
This analysis extends to every positive integer d. We do not display the
kernel, only the solution.
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Table 6: Player’s optimal move under Model B3, indicated by D (draw), S
(stand), or (S,D) (stand with probability 1− p, draw with probability p). Here
p is as in (48).
Player’s two-card hand optimal move
(0, 5), (6, 9), (7, 8) D
(1, 4) (S,D)
(2, 3) S
Theorem 7. Under Model B3 with the number of decks being a positive integer
d, the following Player and Banker strategies are optimal. Player draws on (1, 4)
with probability
p1 =
1
19
, pd =
(12 d− 1)(16 d2 − 14 d+ 1)
32 d2(11 d− 1)
, d ≥ 2, (48)
and Banker draws on {
(8, 8) if d = 1,
(0, 6) if d ≥ 2,
when Player stands, with probability
q1 =
4519
10 716
, q2 =
17 431
64 512
, q3 =
4 425 647
11 132 928
, (49)
qd =
92 160 d4 − 120 128 d3 + 26 336 d2 − 2000 d+ 47
256 d2(11 d− 1)(52 d− 5)
, 4 ≤ d ≤ 7, (50)
q8 =
316 815 305
585 842 688
, (51)
or
qd =
91 648 d4 − 119 488 d3 + 26 032 d2 − 1932 d+ 41
256 d2(11 d− 1)(52 d− 5)
, d ≥ 9. (52)
The value of the game (to Player) is
v1 = −
3 439 451
25 482 800
, v2 = −
49 424 010 137
3 823 801 581 600
, v3 = −
31 717 439 249
2 461 444 457 472
,
vd = −2(1 390 665 728 d
7− 491 115 520 d6+ 50 698 240 d5
+ 2 428 032 d4− 990 512 d3 + 89 192 d2
− 3462 d+ 47)/[(11 d− 1)(52 d)6], 4 ≤ d ≤ 7,
v8 = −
2 789 416 947 665 657
217 430 324 984 396 160
,
25
or
vd = −2(1 391 755 264 d
7− 500 535 296 d6+ 54 174 464 d5
+ 1 931 136 d4− 948 816 d3 + 85 792 d2
− 3238 d+ 41)/[(11 d− 1)(52 d)6], d ≥ 9. (53)
The fully specified optimal strategies for Player and Banker are given in Tables
6 and 5.
Remark. We suspect that the solution is unique but do not have a proof.
Notice what happens as d → ∞: pd → 6/11, qd → 179/286, and vd →
−679 568/53 094 899, so the optimal mixed strategies approach those of Table 3.
Proof. Consider the case d = 6. Let A denote the 25 × 218 payoff matrix, and
let p = (p0, p1, . . . , p31) and q = (q0, q1, . . . , q262 143) denote the stated optimal
strategies. Specifically, with p6 as in (45) and q6 as in (46),
p27 = 1− p19 = p6 and p
i = 0 if i 6= 19, 27.
and
q254 945 = 1− q254 913 = q6 and q
j = 0 if j 6= 254 913, 254 945.
(254 913 and 254 945 are the decimal forms of the binary numbers in (44).)
Then, with v6 as in (47), it suffices to show that
pA ≥ (v6, v6, . . . , v6) (54)
componentwise (218 inequalities), and
AqT ≤ (v6, v6, . . . , v6)
T (55)
componentwise (25 inequalities). Note that it is not necessary to evaluate the
223 entries ofA. (54) involves only rows 19 and 27 ofA (when rows are labeled 0
to 31), while (55) involves only columns 254 913 and 254 945 ofA (when columns
are labeled 0 to 262 143). We have confirmed (54) and (55) using a Mathematica
program. The program is, however, unnecessarily time-consuming. A more
efficient way to proceed is to use Lemma 2 to verify (54), with rows 19 and 27 (of
0–31) being Player’s two pure strategies. (In that case the number of exceptional
cases is 6, namely (0, 6,∅), (1, 5,∅), (2, 4,∅), (3, 3,∅), (7, 9,∅), (8, 8,∅), not 18.
T10 is empty.)
Similar programs give analogous results for every positive integer d. When d
is 1, 2, or 9 and we use the two Banker pure strategies whose mixture is optimal
under Model B2, we find that (54) fails. By determining which components
of the vector inequality fail, we can propose and confirm the correct optimal
strategies under Model B3. Specifically, if d = 2 or d = 9, then (54) fails at
just two components, namely the two that determine Banker’s optimal mixed
strategy under Model B3. If d = 1, then (54) fails at eight components, which
include the two optimal ones. Some trial and error may be required in this case.
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We hasten to add that, just as in the case d = 6, there is a more efficient
way. The two Player pure strategies specified by the kernel do not vary with d
and are rows 19 and 27 (of 0–31). We again apply Lemma 2 to establish (54),
saving time and avoiding the issue that occurred in the cases d = 1, 2, 9. We find
that, for d = 1, 2, . . . , 9, nd = 7, 9, 8, 9, 6, 6, 6, 7, 7, respectively, and, if d ≥ 10,
nd = 6. In each case, T10 is empty.
More importantly, this last method allows us to treat the cases d ≥ 10
simultaneously, similarly to what we did in Section 7. For d ≥ 10, the six points
p(l) (l ∈ {(0, 6,∅), (1, 5,∅), (2, 4,∅), (3, 3,∅), (7, 9,∅), (8, 8,∅)}), relabeled as
p1, p2, . . . , p6, at which Player’s expected payoff is evaluated, satisfy p6 < p1 <
p5 < p3 < p2 < p4, so the algorithm applies with variable d. For d ≥ 10, V (p)
is maximized at p1 (or p(0, 6,∅)). At p6 (or p(8, 8,∅)), for example,
V (p6) = −8(695 877 632 d
7− 281 198 592 d6+ 34 472 064 d5 + 1 177 024 d4
− 901 592 d3 + 119 896 d2 − 6755 d+ 123)/[(22 d− 3)(52 d)6],
and this is less than V (p1) (see (53)) for all d ≥ 10, though the difference tends
to 0 as d→∞.
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